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A. Introduction 
 
Necessary reforms towards a deepened and increased European shaped economic, 
financial and budgetary policy, paraphrased with the term “fiscal union”, could 
possibly reach constitutional limits. In its EFSF judgment
1, the German Constitutional 
Court, following the Lisbon judgment in which certain government tasks were 
determined as being part of the “constitutional identity”
2, connected the budget right 
of the parliament via the principle of democracy to the eternity clause of Art. 79 para 
3 Basic Law. A transfer of essential parts of the budget right of the German 
Bundestag, which would be in conflict with the German constitution, is said to exist 
when the determination of the nature and amount of the tax affecting the citizens is 
largely regulated on the supranational level and thereby deprived of the Bundestag’s 
right to disposition. A reform of the Economic and Monetary Union that touches the 
core of the budget right can, according to the German Federal Court, with regard to 
Art. 79 (3) of the Basic Law only be realized by way of Art. 146 of the Basic Law, thus 
with a new constitution given by the people that replaces the Basic Law.
3 
 
B. Relevant Aspects and Background of the Federal Constitutional Courts Lisbon 
Decision 
 
I. The Context 
 
The referenda in France and the Netherlands scuppered the European Constitutional 
Treaty signed in 2004. Ever since, a debate about the future prospects of the 
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European Union (EU) has erupted in Germany too, often disguised as an argument 
about democracy
4 and culminating in the judgement of the Federal Constitutional 
Court (BVerfG) over the Treaty of Lisbon
5. The judgement in turn triggered a 
sometimes heated debate in the media and academia, which swung from initial 
approval to overriding criticism at least with regard to some aspects.
6  
 
Nevertheless, the Constitutional Courts decision demands respect. It receives 
attention well beyond the borders of Germany and also within the institutions of the 
EU. But some of the statements contained in it continue to invoke irritation, 
uncertainty and criticism. Given the European-wide respect enjoyed by the BVerfG, 
the questions being asked are: Is Germany going off the idea of the EU? What is the 
intention of the highest court in Germany? To what extent do Germans still think in  
European terms ?
7 
 
The BVerfG indeed delivered an ambivalent verdict. On the one hand, one has to 
acknowledge, that, despite the argument of euro-sceptic ringleaders warning of a 
European super-state together with the “demise of the German Basic Law”
8, it did 
make clear that the Treaty of Lisbon and the law approving it were constitutional, 
based on the European option enshrined in the Basic Law. Only in respect of the 
proposed simplified amendments to Article 48 of the ECT the BVerfG did require the 
active approval of the German legislature. Basis for this argument is a convincing 
principle of continuing parliamentary responsibility for European integration (so called 
“Integrationsverantwortung”).
9 
 
On the other hand, the judgements reasoning, its lengthy substantiation, adopts a 
rather restrained, at times even dismissive view of further European integration. This 
is particularly true of the overall context of the decision.  The fundamental mistrust 
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the BVerfG has of political protagonists, even the democratically elected legislature, 
is striking
10. The court spells out a host of requirements for the future European 
policy of Germany and ventures well into the political arena. The “Yes, but” verdict of 
the court may well be the price for the extremely diverse make-up of the Second 
Senate of the BVerfG ultimately reaching a unanimous
11 decision that the Treaty of 
Lisbon is compatible with the German constitution. However, it was that very “but” 
aspect that triggered all the criticism of the verdict and compelled the President of the 
BVerfG to take the unusual step of attempting to explain and elucidate the decision.
12 
 
II. The Federal Constitutional Court’s view of the EU 
 
Not only the Lisbon judgement but also the legal view of the BVerfG on the subject of 
European integration as a whole is strongly influenced by the duality of constitutional 
and international law.
13  However, imaging a river, the EU is currently operating 
somewhere between the international-law banks of an international organisation it 
has long since abandoned and the banks of federal republicanism it has not yet 
reached, and probably never will, in a traditional sense. It currently finds itself floating 
somewhere down the middle of that river. It is in the process of constittutionalisation 
something new, which could be described as a federal association of states, based 
on a multilevel constitution (“Staaten- und Verfassungsverbund”).
14  
 
The Lisbon decision does not do justice to this. It focuses quite clearly on the 
question of German sovereignty. For the BVerfG, the central question is therefore the  
principle of conferral. The court sees this as for the moment assured by the treaty’s 
intended distribution of competence between the EU and its member states.
15 
Nevertheless, its remarks about sovereignty extend well beyond aspects directly 
relevant to the decision, in defining, limiting and ring-fencing the role of Germany 
within the EU as follows: 
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1. Firstly, the BVerfG defines by interlinking sovereignty and democracy some 
specific subjects of state responsibility, which as apart of constitutional identity 
(“identitätsbestimmende Staatsaufgaben”) are not allowed to be touched by 
European measures. These are intended to ensure Germany still has sufficient 
scope for political determination of its economic, cultural and social living conditions. 
Aspects like citizenship, state monopoly on the use of force, fundamental fiscal 
decision-making, external financing, criminal law, cultural and social issues are all 
cited in this passage.
16  
 
2. Furthermore, the BVerfG raises the question of sovereignty in relation to the 
primacy of  European over national law. With reference to one of its earlier 
judgements, it emphasises that such primacy is based on constitutional 
empowerment (Article 23 first sentence of the Basic Law).
17 This leads the court to 
conclude that the primacy of European jurisdiction, when exercised in Germany, only 
extends as far as the Federal Republic has agreed to this in the Act Approving the 
Treaty of Lisbon and was constitutionally entitled to so. In that sense, the BVerfG 
specifies three review provisions
18; in relation to European protection of fundamental 
rights, the exercise of European competence (“ultra-vires  control”) and finally in 
respect of the constitutional identity of the German Basic Law which may not be 
violated by European integration. 
 
Such national reservations are very sensitive issues from a European law 
perspective – on the basis that there is no unity without primacy. The rule of primacy 
in conjunction with the European Court of Justice (ECJ) ensures the uniform 
interpretation and application of common European law in all member states. If the 
27 constitutional courts of the member states were to follow the example of the 
BVerfG, European law would become a fragmented legal system indeed. In response 
to overwhelming criticism from politicians as well as legal scholars,
19 the BVerfG has 
since then partially corrected itself. In the Honeywell verdict,
20 it makes a submission 
to the European Court of Justice, in  a formal sense, and a structural shift in 
competence, in a material sense, the prerequisite for its review of competence.  
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 III. Democracy and the EU 
 
However, the sovereignty element ultimately colours the BVerfG’s view of the future 
of the EU. In its argumentation, the BVerfG links state sovereignty to the democratic 
principles of the Basic Law. 
 
Foreign policy is traditionally the role of the executive, which is why – particularly at 
the level of classic international organisations like the United Nations (UN) or the 
World Trade Organisation (WTO) –  there is generally an absence of democratic 
mechanisms. The democratic deficit of globalisation and internationalisation has its 
origins in the historical, symbiotic growth of nation state and democracy, which has 
defined most democratic theories to this day.  
 
In that context, the BVerfG develops what appears at first glance to be the thoroughly 
correct argument that elections to the European Parliament (EP) reveal a democratic 
deficit when measured against the defining principle of electoral equality (“one man, 
one vote”).
21 Such a structural deficit cannot be offset, according to the BVerfG, by 
the relative dominance of the “bigger” member states in the Council of the EU or the 
EP, but solely by greater involvement of the national parliaments. The BVerfG thus 
accords the EP a minor role, which is at odds with the legal, political and practical 
reality. However, democratic legitimacy cannot be measured by the election rules of 
the EP alone. In many federal systems such as that of the USA, Switzerland and 
even Germany itself, direct representation of citizens (1
st  chamber) and state 
representation (2
nd  chamber) amount to composite systems for the exercise of 
political power. The principle of sliding-scale proportionality itself is democratic to the 
extent that it serves to protect minorities and thus promotes acceptance of the EP in 
the smaller member states. The general elections for many national parliaments are 
conducted with minority quotas or in constituencies of unequal size.  
 
Quite apart from that, the BVerfG rejects any approach for a specific European form 
of democracy. It does not accept the explicitly worded beginnings of a European 
principle of democracy in Articles 10 to 12 of the ECT –  in particular  the dual 
legitimacy approach, where both legitimacy strands of council and national 
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parliaments on the one hand and European Parliament on the other are seen as 
complementary.
22 
 
Once again, in taking this view, the BVerfG is adopting an international law point of 
view. It is almost tragic that, in doing so, the Court is making a democratic example of 
the very organisation that – contrary to classic international organisations like the UN 
and WTO – actually has a parliament that is directly elected by its citizens and has 
wide-reaching decision-making and control powers.   
 
In setting excessively high standards for the EU, is it not the case that the democratic 
principle is being played out against European integration? The current form of the 
EP does not meet the requirements of the (German) principle of democracy, yet the 
EU can only meet such standards if it becomes a federal state, which (by the so-
called “eternity clause” of Article 79 third paragraph of the Basic Law) has 
supposedly been ruled out as an option.
23 In creating such a democratic dilemma, 
the BVerfG is effectively ring-fencing any further European integration from a 
German perspective and at the same time subjecting it to its own control. 
 
C. The German Constitutional Court’s Decision on the Financial Aid to Greece and 
the EFSF 
 
I. Introduction 
 
The court starts the development of its review standards at by resuming its line of 
argument from the Lissabon judgment.
24  The decision concerning the public 
revenues and spending is a key element for the democratic decision-making process 
and democratic self-determination in the constitutional state.
25  As a core area of 
sovereign statehood and part of the German constitutional identity, the budget right is 
a characterization of the principle of democracy. This anchorage results in a link to 
the constitutional eternity clause in Art. 79 para 3 GG and therefore in a “europe 
resistant” budget right. Furthermore, the court states that the German Federal 
Parliament has to retain control over essential budgetary decisions even when 
operating in an intergovernmental system. It doesn’t have the right to confer its 
                                                            
22 See further Calliess, Die neue EU nach dem Vertrag von Lissabon, 2010, p. 167 f. and 250 ff. 
23 BVerfGE 123, p. 267, R. 276 ff. 
24 marginal number 120.   
25 marginal number 122.   8 
budgetary responsibility - a specific characteristic of the responsibility for integration 
also developed in the Lisbon judgment – upon other actors by unspecified budgetary 
authorizations.  
 
II. The Constitutional Limits on Financial Solidarity – the Example of Eurobonds 
 
1. The European Perspective as a Starting Point 
 
a) The Character of Eurobonds 
 
Proposals of Eurobonds exist in various ways. A rough distinction can be drawn on 
the basis of two criteria: the degree of substitution of national issuances (full or 
partial) and the nature of the underlying guarantee (joint and several or several).
26 
Eurobonds which only partially substitute national issuances and which are based on 
several guarantees are considered economically little effective but mostly in line with 
the Law of the European Union.
27  On the other hand Eurobonds with joint and 
several guarantees meet serious legal doubts in the view of the wording and the ratio 
of the so called “No-Bail-Out-Clause”. 
 
b)  The No-Bail-Out-Clause 
 
Article 125 para 1 S. 2 TFEU basically aims to preclude the liability of a member 
state for financial commitments of another member state. The intention of this clause 
– together with Article 123 and 124 TFEU – is to secure in case of an increasing 
government debt that member states of the euro area are sanctioned via the financial 
markets by higher interest rates on their government bonds. That is why by all means 
no member state is obliged to be liable for the government debt of any other member 
state. Apart from that the interpretation of the “No-Bail-Out-Clause” is highly 
controversial in legal scholarship. Especially voluntary financial facilities and the 
allocation of credits are often regarded as not being covered by the “No-Bail-Out-
Clause”.
28 As regards to Eurobonds one may put forward that the wording of the “No-
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Bail-Out-Clause” is anything but clear. It could be submitted that Eurobonds establish 
a joint and several guarantee of all Euro area member states which has to be 
distinguished from Article 125 TFEU dealing only with financial commitments of an 
isolated member state.
29 But in the end the ratio of Article 125 TFEU requires a strict 
interpretation. Only if financial facilities are prohibited comprehensively the “No-Bail-
Out-Clause” can serve its purpose to incentive member states to avoid excessive 
government deficits via higher interest rates on their government bonds. The main 
purpose of (economically effective) Eurobonds is to constitute a joint and several 
liability of the Euro area member states. A Point that runs clearly against the ratio of 
the “No-Bail-Out-Clause” and the main principles of the Economic and Monetary 
Union: stability and financial self-responsibility. So therefore Eurobonds based on 
joint and several guarantees violate Article 125 para 1 S. 2 TFEU.
30 Besides of that it 
has to be stated that the “No-Bail-Out-Clause” could in no way be interpreted as 
setting its purpose against the preservation of the European Economic and Monetary 
Union. Considering the basic idea of Article 122 para 2 TFEU in a case of an 
unindebted financial distress of a euro area member state which effects the stability 
and existence of the Economic and Monetary Union as a whole the “No-Bail-Out-
Clause” does not prohibit indispensable safeguard measures. According to that the 
creation of the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) was not prohibited by 
Article 125 TFEU. A fact which is now confirmed in the amendment of Article 
136 TFEU. 
  
c) The Amendment of Article 136 TFEU 
 
A further question is therefore the legal implication of the new 
Article 136 para 3 TFEU. While confirming the European Law consistency of financial 
facilities as an ultima ratio aiming to safeguard the stability of the euro area as a 
whole one may consider the amendment of Article 136 TFEU as a sufficient legal 
basis for Eurobonds. But such a point of view – in its generality – would misjudge the 
legal nature of the new Article 136para 3 TFEU. First of all the new clause only 
confirms the legal situation regarding the interpretation of the “No-Bail-Out-Clause” in 
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the light of the principle of solidarity.
31 Therefore Article 136 para 3 TFEU does not 
confer any new competences to the European Union.
32    His main purpose is 
declaratory. Secondly Article 136 para 3 TFEU could only be activated if it is 
indispensable to safeguard the stability of the euro area as a whole. Because of that 
the permanent issuance of Eurobonds is hardly possible on the basis of the new 
Article 136 para 3 TFEU. 
With that said Article 136 para 3 TFEU is providing a reference point for the legal 
boundaries of Eurobonds. Eurobonds – such as the financial facilities provided by the 
EFSF – may only be consistent with European Law if they are a temporally limited 
ultima ratio to safeguard the stability of the euro area as a whole granted under strict 
conditionality. That implies that those Eurobonds approaches which only partially 
substitute national issuances are more in line with the legal requirements clarified in 
Article 136 para 3 TFEU because they can temporally limited step aside national 
issuances. As far as it is designated that an independent council or agency is taking 
over the issuance of Eurobonds, such an institution could possibly be based on 
Art. 352 TFEU which has been used as a legal basis for independent agencies in the 
past.
33 
The only temporally limited issuance of Eurobonds may not suffice all economic 
capabilities associated with the concept of Eurobonds
34. But from a legal point of 
view Eurobonds as a permanent concept would require an amendment of the 
European Treaties. Depending on the detailed arrangement of Eurobonds it is 
probably most likely that such an amendment implies the conferral of new 
competences to the European Union. Especially when Eurobonds are connected with 
a more intrusive euro-area economic governance framework. Also considering the 
impact of Eurobonds on the basic principles of the Economic and Monetary Union, 
especially financial self-responsibility, the ordinary revision procedure should be 
applied.  
d) Eurobonds and Enhanced Cooperation 
Moreover the necessity of a treaty revision procedure could not be avoided by using 
enhanced cooperation. Because first and foremost rules based on enhanced 
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cooperation have to be in line with the legal framework of the European Union. 
Therefore the prohibition of permanent Eurobonds based on joint and several 
guarantees due to Article 125 para 1 S. 2 TFEU cannot be circumvented by using 
enhanced cooperation. As far as Eurobonds are temporally limited permitted by 
Article 136 para 3 TFEU there is actually also no need for enhanced cooperation. 
Because in this case the issuance of Eurobonds could be arranged either by an 
independent agency based on Article 352 TFEU or outside the legal framework of the 
European Union just as the EFSF. 
Nonetheless the concept of a permanent common bond market for the euro area 
does fit in the political concept of differentiated integration. In this respect it is in line 
with the “Euro-Plus-Pact” or the latest “Treaty on Stability, Coordination and 
Governance”, the Fiscal Compact.  All these measures may lead into a more or less 
deepened economic and political integration laying the foundation for Eurobonds. But 
from a strict legal point of view they do not provide any basis for Eurobonds. 
 
2. The German Perspective 
 
Statements on the Constitutional Court’s decision on the financial aid to Greece and 
the EFSF seem to show a major disagreement over the decision’s long-term impact, 
particularly with regard to the lawfulness of Eurobonds as well as further transfer of 
power within the area of economic and financial policy. 
 
As far as this can be understood as a restriction on the Parliament to commit itself to 
measures impacting the government finances in an unpredictable way without 
essential prior consent, it cannot be interpreted as a clear and absolute limit for 
further reform plans. The expression “unforeseeable” is too indefinite to draw such a 
conclusion. Particularly the euro rescue fund intended for 2013 shouldn’t violate 
those criteria, especially because the establishment requires the approval of the 
German Parliament. Furthermore, it meets the criteria of a definitive aim, credit 
volume and basic modalities.
35 However, the widely discussed Eurobonds, the debt 
investments with joint liability issued by all member states, are already in a grey area. 
Much will depend on how they are implemented in practice: significant aspects are 
the approval of each involved member state, their limitation in time and volume and a 
link with clear conditions for a budgetary consolidation. In short, there should be no 
incentives for a permanent transfer union 
                                                            
35 marginal number 139 f.   12 
 
The Court’s conclusion, that as a consequence of the democratic anchorage of the 
budgetary autonomy, the German Parliament is not allowed to approve a guarantee 
and payment automatism, appears to be consistent with the plans to build the ESM 
as long as the allowed loans are conditional as regards content and as long as the 
measures are accompanied sufficiently by Parliament.  It only agreed upon on an 
intergovernmental or supranational level. Secondly isn`t bind by strict guidelines and 
could have unknown and unrestrictable effects and thirdly once up and running is 
withdrawn from his control and influence.  
 
When it comes to implement future reform plans, another part of the judgment is of 
interest. The court constitutes that “no permanent measures coming from 
international law can be established if they result in an assumption of liabilities for 
decisions made by other states, especially if they may entail risks which are difficult 
to assess.” Despite how it may seem at first glance the judicial guideline quoted 
above does not preclude a permanent ESM. The ESM doesn’t lead to an assumption 
of liabilities. Furthermore, it may be designed as a permanent mechanism, but the 
single loans granted to the states that have to come under the rescue umbrella are 
conditional with regard to content and limited in time and volume. In view of this 
wording the implementation of Eurobonds could be quite critical, given that the main 
characteristic of Eurobonds is a joint liability for decisions made by another country in 
the Eurozone. But again it`s only a question of implementing Eurobonds in practice. 
In particular the above mentioned limitation in time requires a distinction between the 
two concepts that have been considered for Eurobonds. In fact, only Eurobonds 
structured with regard to contents of the blue bond proposal seem to be legal under 
constitutional law because the parliament has to approve every new requirement. 
Consequently the issuance of the bonds wouldn`t be permanent. The parliament 
would still be in charge of the way of how funds made available are dealt with. 
 
Of particular interest - especially for the establishment of Eurobonds - is another 
aspect of the judgment: Resuming a passage from its Lisbon decision the court 
states that a transfer of power in the area of the parliament’s budget right violates the 
principle of democracy and the right to vote in the elections for the federal parliament. 
This is especially the case when the specifications regarding the expense type and 
level are mostly transferred to the EU and are therefore not within the Parliaments 
power anymore. In particularly the aspect concerning the credit limit could cause a 
problem when transferring these statements to Eurobonds. The court itself didn’t set   13 
explicitly a clear limit for the assumption of liabilities and hence its decision is 
discussed controversy. According to some authors,  there are no constitutional 
barriers limiting the credit volume and consequently the lawfulness of Eurobonds.
36 
Aside, other authors pointed out that not mentioning an exact limit doesn’t mean that 
there is none.
37 The court only took the legislators sphere of influence into account. 
Hence, a possible upper limit would be overstepped when the budgetary autonomy is 
totally undermined.
38  
 
This is the link to the second opinion. In brief, it shows that the restrictions of 
guarantees are more difficult compared to the restrictions of the dept levels, because 
the probability of default has to be considered additionally.
39  Consequently they 
argue that the limit set by the constitution is exceeded when the refinancing of the 
guarantees is not possible any more. This might already be the case when Germany 
has to assume liability for the debts of just one of the bigger European countries. As 
a result, the complete replacement of national depts through Eurobonds would 
exceed the limit definitely as proposed by the Green Paper of the Commission. 
 
III. At the Constitutional Limits? 
 
The constitutional barriers addressed by the court towards a parliamentary self-
restrain concerning the budget right may - mildly put - cause a tension (one could 
also speak of contradiction) with another section of the decision. In this other 
passage the court refers to his Maastricht decision and rightly points out again that 
the basis and the subject of the German act of sanctioning is a Monetary Union 
contractually conceived as a Union of stability.
40 The experiences of the past few 
months have shown that the with the Maastricht Treaty agreed and constitutionally 
required safeguarding of the stability is only possible with considerable restrictions. 
The crisis has to be seen and turned into an opportunity to complement the Monetary 
Union with the Economic and Fiscal Union along with a European budgetary 
surveillance. This treaty amendment is already overdue. By anchoring the budget 
right to the core of the democratic principle and therefore  declaring it to an 
unchangeable part of the constitutional identity with regard to Art. 79 para 3 GG the 
                                                            
36 Möllers, FAZ 20.10.2011, S.6.  
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38 marginal number 135. 
39 Mayer/Heidfeld, NJW 2012, 422 (426 f. ) 
40 marginal number. 129 respectively guiding principle 4   14 
court seems to bar this way. According to the court’s interpretation of the constitution, 
it requires on one hand a Monetary Unions in form of a stability community but on the 
other hand it sets barriers for the planned measures ensuring the sustainable 
assurance of the euro.  
 
This dilemma in the court’s decision not only raises the question if a more cautious 
judgment might be necessary with regard to  the fact that more specific reform 
projects might have to be reviewed under constitution law. More important is its 
impact for the very controversially discussed debate over para 31 para 1 BVerfGG 
and the scope and binding effect of constitutional decisions. The BVerfG assumes in 
its established case law that the main ground of the decision is also binding for the 
addressees of para 31 para 1 BVerfGG.
41 Contrarily, some legal literature  only sees 
the operative part of the judgment, which in this case is the rejection of the 
constitutional appeal, as legally binding.
42  However, the BVerfG furthermore states 
that future reform projects are not only bound by the operative provisions of the 
judgment but also by the ground of the decision as long as it is fundamental. This 
possibly applies to the above quoted statements, which form the third guiding 
principle. 
 
This dilemmas judicial dissolution could be facilitated considerably when putting the 
court’s considerations in the context with the integration order (Preamble, Art. 23 
para 1 GG) and the identity guarantee (Art. 79 para 3 GG). This leads to dissolution 
of tensions during which the untouchable core of the budget right as protected by Art. 
79 para 3 GG has to be exposed. Only an interference in this area could lead to an 
impermissible treaty amendment. Then again this can only be the conclusion on an 
individual case analysis. 
 
If this is not possible, a reform of the treaties aiming at an approved protection of the 
community of stability is impossible. Although the BVerfG consistently demands for 
such a community, the consequences of a failed dissolution would affect the 
safeguarding measures for the stability of the Euro. They would have to remain under 
the necessary and politically realisable measures or the reform of the European 
Treaties could only be accomplished at the price of abandoning the existing 
constitution. 
                                                            
41   BVerfGE 1, 14 (37); 19, 377 (392); 20, 56 (87); 40, 88 (93 f.); 96, 375 (404);  104, 151 (197). 
42   Com. the citation at Heusch, in: Umbach/Clemens/Dollinger (Hrsg.), BVerfGG, 2. Auflage 2005, para 
31, Rn. 58 mit Fn. 176 ff.   15 
 
IV. Conclusions 
 
From a legal point of view, a distinction must be made between two levels of the 
German discussion on the EU. 
 
At the micro-level, the court’s ruling picks up a debate about the role of the 
Commission and the ECJ in the integration process, which has been the subject of 
critical debate for some time now in Germany. After both institutions adopted a 
politically sanctioned active role during the first decades of European integration, the 
treaty of Maastricht in 1992, at the very latest, marked a turning point in Germany. It 
was triggered by numerous and in some cases far-reaching transfers of power to the 
European level. The introduction of the subsidiarity principle into the Treaties as a 
counterbalance was the visible expression of this turning point. The Commission and 
ECJ, however, did not pick up on that but instead gave the impression that they 
wanted to continue being the “driving force of integration”. That inflamed opposition, 
to the point where a newspaper article appeared with the headline “Stop the 
European Court of Justice”
43. It was written by the former German Federal President, 
Roman Herzog, who had previously been a prominent voice at the European level 
too – as Chairman of the Convention for the Charter of Human Rights. His very hard-
hitting article sparked criticism but found also a great deal of approval. The lasting 
effect of this discussion might explain the limiting approach, especially the mentioned 
review provisions contained in the Lisbon decision of the BVerfG.  
 
At the macro-level, the decision of the BVerfG picks up a widespread social unease, 
in Germany but as well in other member states, about European integration. The EU 
has now expanded to include 27, to some extent, very heterogeneous member 
states. At the same time, political integration, even in some rather sensitive areas, 
continues to advance. Increasingly people are asking where European integration, 
which so successfully brought peace and prosperity in the period following 1945, is 
heading. Should the EU, as it was formulated in the Preamble to the EEC Treaty of 
1957, pursuing the open goal of an “ever closer union among the people of Europe” 
and thus shift to a kind of federation? That has been the intention of Germany’s 
European policy since Konrad Adenauer, Willy Brandt, Helmut Schmidt through to 
                                                            
43 Herzog/Gerken, Stoppt den Europäischen Gerichtshof, FAZ of 8 September 2008, p. 8.   16 
Helmut Kohl. Or should the EU be reduced to a purely economically related 
community, an internal European market only? 
 
Moreover the widening, most recently the inclusion of Bulgaria and Romania, and in 
future perhaps Turkey, is making the EU more and more heterogeneous, in a political 
and economic sense. On the opposite side of the coin, deeper political integration – 
at least in the minds of ordinary citizens –  presupposes a certain degree of 
homogeneity. A debate over the extent of competition in the internal market invokes 
the fear, well known from the context of globalisation, that a decline in living 
standards is to be expected by putting pressure on the German (Western European) 
social model. Intuitively ordinary citizens are looking to “their own” state for 
protection. 
 
Since the failed Constitutional Treaty, earlier discussion about the EU’s “remoteness 
from ordinary citizens” and “democratic deficit” was coupled with criticism of 
European integration as a “project of the elite”.
44 Ultimately, however, it is a matter of 
how political the EU is able and allowed to be. The more political the EU becomes, 
the more it needs broad democratic legitimacy. Member states have given their 
citizens the false impression for decades now that European integration is primarily 
an economic project that has little to do with their everyday lives. Since the Treaty of 
Maastricht, however, those same citizens have increasingly been confronted with the 
political reality of the EU. For instance, it is only now in the midst of this crisis that 
many are starting to realise that the euro also has a political dimension.  
 
Since there has never been a referendum in Germany over the European treaties, 
the BVerfG seems keen to use its Lisbon decision as a vehicle for expressing the 
above described unease of many ordinary citizens. With its statements about the 
meaning of the EU and the constitutional limits of further European integration, the 
BVerfG has ventured well into the political arena.
45 In doing so, it  failed not only to 
meet the perspective of integration, but also the historical consensus that European 
economic integration was not an end in itself but rather intended to pave the way for 
an ever closer political union among the peoples (and states) of Europe within the 
EU. To that end, the Basic Law requires Germany to become part of the EU and 
                                                            
44  Heinig, Europäisches Verfassungsrecht ohne Verfassungs(vertrag)?, JZ 2007, p. 905 (908); von 
Arnim, Das Europa Komplott, Wie EU-Funktionäre unsere Demokratie verscherbeln, 2006, p. 39 ff.; de 
Winter, Wo steckt Europas Seele?, Der Spiegel 19/2004, p. 152 (158); Darnstädt, Erklärt Europa, Der 
Spiegel 29/2009, p. 34. 
45 Nettesheim, Entmündigung der Politik, FAZ No. 198 of 27 August 2009, p. 8.   17 
contribute to the ongoing development of the EU and it also makes provision for the 
necessary adjustments to European requirements. The relevant article of the Basic 
Law about Europe (Article 23.1 first sentence) makes conformity with its fundamental 
constitutional principles a condition of integration. But it does not demand that the EU 
exactly meets the German standards of democracy, the rule of law and fundamental 
rights. 
 
Finally the question arises as to how far the statements of the BVerfG have any 
binding effect on political exponents in Germany. This is firstly a question of the legal 
force of decisions made by the BVerfG. It relates only to the decision-making 
formula, but not to the elements of the decision that are contained in the reasons 
given for the verdict.
46 In so far as the sense of the decision-making formula can only 
be conveyed in the context of the underlying reasons, however, the binding principle 
also applies to them. Constitutional court decisions have a specific binding effect that 
extends even further, according to para31 of the Federal Constitutional Court Act, but 
the extent of their reach is controversial. If the view of the BVerfG is to be followed, 
the underlying reasons for its decisions must also be considered along with the 
decision-making formula whenever the Treaty of Lisbon is applied in Germany. The 
underlying reasons are those that cannot be ignored without nullifying the specific 
decision-making outcome as it is expressed in the decision-making formula. This 
means that not every passage of the Lisbon decision is equally binding on all future 
European policies. To what extent the verdict of the BVerfG binds politicians in 
Germany to European integration can therefore only ever be determined on a case-
by-case basis. No one-size-fits-all statement would be appropriate. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
46 BVerfGE 123, p. 267, R. 40 ff.   18 
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